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Normative legal philosophy primarily concerns itself with the task of
understanding which weighty reasons should guide our legal insti-
tutions. In order to make sense of these reasons, we must pursue a
certain amount of conceptual analysis. Concepts allow us to make
sense of our reasons. This is as true in law as it is elsewhere in the
normative landscape.
At a time when politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are
challenging the role of epistemic authorities and factual claims in
democratic decision-making (through reference to ‘alternative facts’,
‘fake news’, and other objectionable propositions), the analysis of the
legal status of false and misleading claims is extremely important. By
clarifying the status of truth and falsity in civil discourse, philoso-
phers can make a real and significant contribution to the upkeep of
the norms of civil society. The stakes of such discussion are high.
Seana Shiffrin’s recent and important book, Speech Matters, con-
tributes to this exercise in a clear, compelling, and innovative
manner. It begins with a simple problem. We must form a mutual
understanding of the circumstances that we share with fellow moral
agents in order to cooperate and live minimally decent lives.
Ensuring that our interactions are respectful requires knowledge of
our fellow citizens’ thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and needs. Without
this knowledge, we cannot ensure the aptness of our moral judge-
ments.
This knowledge is especially important in coercive contexts. The
freedom-restricting nature of coercion ensures that morally appro-
priate laws must be sensitive to these factors. Our ability to discharge
our moral, political, and legal duties depends on possessing the
knowledge required to form the mutual understanding necessary for
cooperation. Yet, this knowledge is difficult to obtain because we can
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only guess and infer from the behaviour of other moral agents which
thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and needs they hold dear. This basic
hurdle to fulfilling the requirements of morality gives the spoken
word critical importance as the most precise and authoritative
mechanism through which we can convey our mental content to
each other. In short, morality requires us to share ourselves with
others.
Lies and deception both obstruct this process in different ways.
Whereas the folk intuition suggests that lying is wrong when it
deceives, Shiffrin’s argument begins by separating out these two
notions and suggesting that they each pose different obstructions to
the moral community. According to Shiffrin, a lie is an intentional
assertion by A to B of a proposition P such that:
1. A does not believe P, and
2. A is aware that A does not believe P, and
3. A intentionally presents P in a manner or context that objectively
manifests A’s intention that B is to take and treat P as an accurate
representation of A’s belief.1
Crucially, P need not be false. Although A need not believe P, A need
not believe P to be false either. Rather, A can remain agnostic about
the truth of P. Because of this, Alice does not need to intend to
deceive Brian when she lies to him. Although many lies do deceive,
the success of a lie remains independent of Alice’s persuasiveness or
Brian’s credulity at Alice’s assertion. Lies can evade the truth rather
than establish falsehood.
This difference ensures that lies differ from deceit in (at least)
three ways:
a) Deception must impart a false belief or confirm a pre-existing false
belief, whereas a lie need not affect B’s mental content at all.
b) B must believe a successful deceptive proposition but need not believe
a successful lie.
c) Deception need not involve speech acts but lying must.
1 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2014), p. 12.
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Shiffrin’s claim that lies and deception are two compatible but dis-
tinct phenomena is commendable and follows a growing trend in the
philosophical literature.2 On this view, lying is a form of speech that
changes our discursive circumstances rather than necessarily trans-
mitting false beliefs to others.3 Cases where lies and deceit come
apart include:
Pure Lies – A may lie by asserting what A mistakenly believes to be false
(and yet happens to be true).4
Bald-Faced Lies – A may lie by asserting to B something that both parties
know is false.5
Knowledge-Lies – A may lie by asserting to B something that makes it more
difficult for B to know the truth (but need not lead B to believe a
falsehood).6
These cases cast doubt on the folk intuition and reveal the
relationship between lies and deception to be more complex than
commonly assumed. In this article, I offer two comments on
Shiffrin’s explanation of the distinct wrongfulness of lying: First, I’ll
summarise Shiffrin’s explanation of the wrong-making features of
lying and suggest that it may possess broader explanatory power as it
can explain the wrongfulness of other objectionable speech acts.
Second, I’ll consider Shiffrin’s explanation of when it is permissible to
misrepresent ourselves to others and contend that she is too quick to
reject alternatives to her view.
2 Examples of this trend include: Thomas Carson, ‘The Definition of Lying’, Noûs 40 (2006): 284–
306; Roy Sorensen, ‘Bald-faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
88 (2007): 251–64; Don Fallis, ‘What is Lying?’, Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 29–56; Thomas Carson,
Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Roy Sorensen,
‘Knowledge-lies’, Analysis 70 (2010): 608–15; Jennifer Saul, Lying, Misleading, and What is Said (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012): 8–10; Andreas Stokke, ‘Lying and Asserting’, Journal of Philosophy 110
(2013): 33–60. For criticism, see Jennifer Lackey, ‘Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce’, Analysis 73
(2013): 236–48.
3 For example, Roy Sorensen labels both bald-faced lies and knowledge-lies as forms of ‘Conver-
sational Cheating’, Sorensen, ‘Knowledge-lies’, p. 614.
4 Shiffrin, Speech Matters, p. 116.
5 Carson, ‘The Definition of Lying’, p. 290; Sorensen, ‘Bald-faced Lies!’; Don Fallis, ‘Are Bald-Faced
Lies Deceptive After All?’, Ratio 28 (2015): 81–96. For criticism, see Patrick Leland, ‘Rational Respon-
sibility and the Assertoric Character of Bald-Faced Lies’, Analysis 75 (2015): 550–54.
6 Sorensen, ‘Knowledge-lies’. Whether knowledge-lies are actual lies appears more controversial
than pure lies or bald-faced lies. For criticism, see Julia Staffel, ‘Reply to Roy Sorensen, ‘Knowledge-
Lies’, Analysis 71 (2011): 300–02.
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I. THE WRONGFULNESS OF LYING
Shiffrin argues that the importance of speech in facilitating cooper-
ation with our fellow moral agents can ground a moral duty to
promote truthful understanding and a default presumption in favour
of truthful communication. This duty often encompasses require-
ments of sincerity (believing what we say) and accuracy (taking
reasonable steps to avoid falsehood and misunderstanding).7 Lies and
deception both contravene this duty in different ways: ‘Deception is
wrong because it unduly hazards the false for the deceiver’s own
purposes, whereas lying is wrong because it places the certainty of
truth out of reach for the liar’s own purposes’.8
The wrong of deception hinges on the violation of a duty to take
care not to cause others to form false beliefs based on our behaviour.
When this duty exists, deception is wrong. In contrast, the wrong of
lying hinges on the fact that it operates on a maxim that, if uni-
versalised, would deprive us of crucial truths and a central method of
distinguishing truth from falsehood. When we lie, we risk under-
mining our most trustworthy method of learning the thoughts, be-
liefs, feelings, and needs of our fellow moral agents. We require this
information for mutual understanding and cooperation, and these
are compulsory moral aims. So, lying threatens to obstruct full moral
relations, and by doing so, wrongs the listener, the speaker, and
humanity at large.9
This explanation of the wrong of lying resembles a discursive
failure of moral-recognition respect.10 Lying obstructs full moral
relations with other agents by preventing us from establishing the
understanding required to cooperate respectfully. Lying is symp-
tomatic of a form of disrespect for the status of ourselves and others
as equal moral agents. Because of this, each lie symbolises a failure to
respect the moral equality mandated by our capacity for agency:
My basic argument is that the fundamental responsibility to secure and protect the individual
and social conditions under which we possess [moral] agency and under which we may
understand and acquit our moral duties exerts a lexical priority. To satisfy this responsibility, our
reasons for action must take a form that, if known and regarded as permissible, would maintain
7 Shiffrin, Speech Matters, p. 11.
8 Ibid, p. 23.
9 Ibid, pp. 23–4.
10 Stephen Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics 88 (1977): 36–49.
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the epistemic conditions and presumptions that enable successful moral agency, rather than
jeopardising them, calling them into question, or rendering their existence merely accidental.11
By characterising the wrong of lying as a discursive obstruction to
the moral community, Shiffrin’s argument achieves an important
goal. It explains the specific wrong of lying through a broader
explanation of the wrongfulness of a species of disruptive objection-
able speech acts. I suggest that this explanation of the wrong-making
features of lying should be of broad interest because, if proved
plausible, it may also explain the wrongfulness of other objectionable
forms of speech that threaten to obstruct social relations.
To see this, consider the problem of ‘silencing’ or subordinating
speech.12 Suppose that A is silenced when B speaks in a manner that
makes it more difficult:
(1) For A to voice A’s own opinion freely, and/or
(2) For A’s opinion to receive a fair hearing, and/or
(3) For A to voice A’s opinion without risk of being deliberately misun-
derstood.
Alice can be silenced either by Brian enforcing formal rules that
restrict her opportunities to converse with her fellow interlocutors
(e.g., strict exclusionary rules) or by Brian perpetuating norms that
undermine the apparent sincerity of Alice’s speech (e.g., slurs or
stereotypes). Both forms of behaviour offer Brian ways of preventing
Alice from communicating as she wishes.13
Explaining why such actions are wrongful is a tricky business.
Clearly, silencing can harm.14 However, proof of the causation of
harm from individual speech acts is difficult. Not every act that
silences must harm because not every instance of communication
benefits. While it is true that the capacity for communication gen-
erally benefits (and so silencing generally harms), explaining the
distinctive wrong of each individual silencing act in terms of harm is
difficult. Non-consequentialists find this instrumental explanation
11 Shiffrin, Speech Matters, p. 26.
12 I intend the following brief definition to be reasonably ecumenical between competing definitions
of this complex phenomenon.
13 Rae Langton, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 293–330;
Jennifer Hornsby, ‘Disempowered Speech’, Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 127–47; Ishani Maitra, ‘Si-
lencing Speech’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 309–38. For a recent summary, see Wesley
Buckwater, ‘Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition’, Australian Journal of Philosophy, Online First: 1–15,
pp. 3–5.
14 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991 [1859]): p. 21.
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unsatisfying. Thus, it is common to look elsewhere to discover a
non-instrumental explanation of the wrongfulness of silencing.15
However, we cannot simply appeal to freedom of speech to
provide non-harm-based reasons against silencing. It might appear
tempting to characterise silencing as a rights-violation by claiming
that silencing infringes the speaker’s right to freedom of speech.
However, the difficulty with this argument is that the right in
question must incur a positive duty on the listener to be heard on
fair terms. In order for the rights-violation argument to encompass
anything more than (1), the meaning of Alice’s speech must also be
recognised as worthy of protection. Our right to free speech must
protect speech as more than mere locution.16
Without this recognition, Brian does not contravene Alice’s right
to speak freely if he consistently dismisses the meaning of her words
out of hand, perpetually misconstrues her phrasing, or intentionally
misunderstands her speech for reasons other than her speech’s
content (e.g., because of her gender, race, or age). When Brian acts
in this way, he silences Alice by undermining the meaning of her
words without preventing her actual acts of expression. Such actions
are disrespectful even when they don’t directly harm Alice. If we
want the rights-violation explanation of silencing to satisfactorily
account for this pernicious behaviour, then our right to free speech
must protect both intended meaning and literal speech. Establishing
that the right to free speech can be consistently characterised in this
way without threatening to become overly demanding remains a
significant controversy.17 Specifically, we need to know how much
discursive uptake and communicative reciprocity our rights to free
speech can demand of listeners.
15 One prominent example of this trend is Miranda Fricker’s Kantian notion of ‘Epistemic Objec-
tification’. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chpt. 6. There is
an interesting family resemblance between Fricker’s and Shiffrin’s arguments grounded in respect for
the discursive standing of individuals as epistemic and moral agents.
16 Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, ‘Free Speech and Illocution’, Legal Theory 4 (1998): 21–37.
17 Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987);
Rae Langton, ‘Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers’, Philosophy & Public Affairs
19 (1990): 311–59; Catherine MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1993); Langton, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’; Daniel Jacobson, ‘Freedom of Speech Acts? A
Response to Langton’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 24 (1995): 64–79; Hornsby and Langton, ‘Free Speech
and Illocution’; Ronald Dworkin, ‘Women and Pornography’, The New York Review of Books (21 October
1993); Leslie Green, ‘Pornographizing, Subordination and Silencing’, in R.C. Post (ed.) Censorship and
Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Los Angeles: The Getty Research Institute, 1998): 285–312;
Lorna Finlayson, ‘How to Screw Things with Words’, Hypatia 29 (2014): 774–89.
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So, a gap needs to be filled. We need an explanation of the
intrinsic wrong of silencing that does not simply reduce to harm and
an explanation of the reciprocal moral demands of discourse to in-
form our free speech rights. I suggest that Shiffrin’s Kantian argu-
ment concerning the obstruction of moral relations between agents
(and her subsequent ‘Thinker-Based’ approach to free speech’) ap-
pears well suited to this task.
Silencing, like lying, deprives the target of the full status of a
moral agent. Silencing, like lying, strips the target of discursive tools
required to participate fully in the moral community. Silencing, like
lying, fails to acknowledge the value of our collective ends. Finally,
silencing, like lying, threatens our mutual understanding that
underpins the moral community. Thus, silencing shares significant
wrong-making features with lying when we view lying from Shif-
frin’s perspective. Silencing also fails the same moral test: A uni-
versalised maxim that permits the unjustified silencing of particular
groups or individuals would deprive us of forms of respectful dis-
course that are owed to other agents. Specifically, the reasons for
such action will not ‘…take a form that, if known and regarded as
permissible, would maintain the epistemic conditions and pre-
sumptions that enable successful moral agency…’.18
Of course, lying and silencing are two distinct phenomena. For
example, they differ in that lying makes it more difficult to tell truth
from falsity, whereas silencing makes it more difficult to be heard
and understood as we intend. Furthermore, lying invites and abuses
trust whereas silencing merely erodes it.19 These differences explain
the differing content and demandingness of the preventative duties
corresponding to each act. However, both phenomena threaten our
capacity to form a mutual understanding with our fellow moral
agents. As a result, I suggest that Shiffrin’s explanation of why non-
deceptive lying is wrong may play some role in explaining our duties
concerning other forms of objectionable speech. By providing a
satisfying general explanation of the wrongful nature of these forms
of speech, Shiffrin’s argument can offer important Kantian insights to
debates aside from those over the legal status of lying.
18 Shiffrin, Speech Matters, p. 26.
19 Collin O’Neil, ‘Lying, Trust, and Gratitude’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012): 301–33. Thanks
to an anonymous reviewer for drawing this difference to my attention.
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II. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF MISREPRESENTATION
I have suggested that Shiffrin’s account of lying is broadly compelling
and that her respect-based explanation of the wrongfulness of lying
may extend to explain the wrongs of other types of objectionable,
disruptive, and subordinating speech. This is a strength of the gen-
eral nature of her view. By explaining the narrow wrong of lying as
an instance of a broader moral wrong (obstructing moral relations),
Shiffrin opens her argument to being extended to other forms of
speech that commit the same wrong in different ways. In this sec-
tion, I turn to consider her related claims concerning the permissi-
bility of intentionally misleading wrongdoers (such as Kant’s famous
Murderer-at-the-Door).
Shiffrin argues that it is permissible to lie to another moral agent
when we find ourselves in a morally justified suspended context – a
context where ‘…the normative presumption of truthfulness is
suspended because these contexts serve other valuable purposes
whose achievement depends upon the presumption’s suspension and
the fact and justification of the suspension are publicly accessible’.20
Such contexts transform an objectionable lie into a justified falsifi-
cation by negating the third condition of Shiffrin’s definition of a lie:
3. A intentionally presents P in a manner or context that objectively
manifests A’s intention that B is to take and treat P as an accurate
representation of A’s belief.
Therefore, the moral justification of suspending the context within
which Brian may treat P as an accurate representation of Alice’s
belief is where we must concern ourselves. The most plausible
explanation of this justification will explain when we are justified in
misleading others. Although we will mislead in these circumstances,
we will not lie because the misled will have no morally justified
reason to expect the truth from us.
Shiffrin’s explanation of justifiably suspended contexts centres on
the content of what we intend to misrepresent.21 If the content of our
lie would further the listener’s destruction of the moral community,
then we may permissibly misrepresent our beliefs to them without
fear of wronging them (as we would if we had lied to them). This is
20 Shiffrin, Speech Matters, p. 16.
21 Ibid, pp. 32–7.
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because the intended aim of the listener’s immoral action justifiably
suspends the context within which she may reasonably expect to
hear the truth from the speaker.
The limits of permissible misrepresentation are set by the
requirement that we respect the listener’s agency by ensuring the
possibility of moral redemption and their return to a more truthful
context. No agent should be cast out of the moral community
permanently and truthful speech plays an important part in both
learning from our moral mistakes and participating with our fellow
moral agents.22 The problem that Shiffrin is trying to avoid is that
the wrongdoer becomes stranded in a truth-free zone:
One thematic way to put what troubles me about the idea that the murderer becomes a truth-
free zone is that, were it a rule, it would place him in something like solitary confinement,
without reliable access to a decent means of understanding the external world and human
relations, and, further, without a compass for finding the exit … Placing someone in this
predicament, I think, is inconsistent with continuing to see him as a member of the moral
community, albeit one of poor standing.23
In these circumstances, truthfulness becomes a type of ‘White-Flag’
convention that we rely on in times of vulnerability in order to
maintain ways of escaping discursive conflict. Lies and misrepresen-
tation both make it more difficult for the listener to distinguish truth
from falsehood. As a result, both phenomena threaten to isolate us
from the moral community. The main difference between the two is
that misrepresentation occurs in a justified suspended context. This
permits us to treat the listener in a way that would otherwise be
objectionable. However, being treated in this way still threatens
isolation, and this isolation is inconsistent with the respect due to our
fellow moral equals. Thus, permissible misrepresentation has a
limiting threshold below which we cannot sink for fear of isolating
the listener.
Shiffrin argues that her substantive ‘Content-Based’ argument is
more plausible than its competitors. However, I am concerned that
she dismisses procedural alternatives to her content-based approach
too quickly. Rather than linking the permissibility of misrepresen-
tation to the content of what is said, procedural explanations of the
permissibility of misleading rely on the notion of reciprocity to argue
that: ‘Because the wrongdoer does not follow the rules, the general
rules do not apply to him and therefore, we can lie in order to
22 Ibid, p. 39.
23 Ibid, p. 38.
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constrain him, not because of the content of our misrepresentation
but because his interactions with and among us do not comply with
the rules that render him eligible for truthful communication…’.24
Shiffrin dismisses proceduralism for being fatally over-inclusive
and cites the white-flag worry of isolation as a motivating concern.25
She is concerned that lying to liars merely because they have lied to
us will lead us all too easily into a truth-free zone of no return. But
this dismissal is too quick. It does not follow from the adoption of
procedural rules that such an account cannot limit the sorts of
misrepresentation it permits nor prevent the isolation of listeners.
Although Shiffrin has a particular interpretation of Kant in mind
here, there is a range of possible forms of proceduralism we could
adopt.26 Crucially, a procedural explanation that rejects the sub-
stantive content-based approach but accepts constraints grounded in
the requirements of respect (including avoiding the harms of epis-
temic isolation) remains open.
This is because we can construe respect for moral agents in
procedural as well as substantive terms. Such a view could accept
similar limits as a content-based approach but would link the
wrongfulness of misrepresentation to set of procedural rules of truth-
telling that are required by a well-functioning moral community. If
an agent breaks those rules, then others may also do so in order to
avoid harm in the short term and bring that individual back in line
with the requirements of membership of the moral community in
the long term. As one possible example, consider a form of discursive
right-forfeiture where liars forfeit their rights against being misled
when they lie to other agents.27 So long as the wrongdoer in
question is aware of the ‘rules of the communication game’ and the
possibility of reciprocal misleading, then it is compatible with respect
for them as an epistemic peer that we hold them responsible for their
lies in this way.
24 Ibid, pp. 31–2.
25 Ibid, pp. 30–2.
26 Tamar Schapiro’, Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances’ Ethics 117 (2006): 32–57.
27 Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment’, Ethics 122 (2012):
371–93; Christopher Heath Wellman, Rights Forfeiture and Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2017). For criticism, see Massimo Renzo, ‘Rights Forfeiture and Liability to Harm’, Journal of Political
Philosophy 25 (2017): 324–42.
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Procedural approaches of this kind may simply provide a different
route to a similar end as Shiffrin’s own content-based approach. Both
views would function to protect the moral community in their own
ways.28 We need not deny this similarity to criticise proceduralism.
For it may be the case that there is something particularly offensive
about lying to liars in order to make them tell the truth which means
that it is an ineffective tool for enforcing norms of truthfulness.
Alternatively, we might worry that the hypocrisy involved in such
interactions is fundamentally inconsistent with the aims of returning
liars to the moral community. If either of these worries were the
case, then procedural arguments would be an unattractive route to
take. But these are not the sorts of objections that Shiffrin offers
against proceduralism. Rather, it is the worry about escalation and
the loss of white flag conventions that motivates her dismissal of the
view, and this worry seems unfounded given the breadth of possible
procedures that might be adopted.
There is nothing prima facie inconsistent with a procedural ap-
proach adopting constraints to prevent escalation and isolation. Such
constraints could prevent reciprocal lying from escalating to create a
truth-free zone because this consequence will prevent them from
achieving their goal of returning wrongdoers to the moral com-
munity. If the purpose of the reciprocal breach of the relevant truth
norms is to return others back to playing by the rules of the com-
munal game, then isolation would hinder this purpose. Such esca-
lation would be self-defeating.29
Sadly, investigating the further details of this family of views is a
task for another time. In this brief discussion, I hope to have ex-
plored the possible strengths and weaknesses of Shiffrin’s compelling
work on the wrong of lying, and I welcome further discussion in our
attempts to understand the normative importance of lying in both
morality and law.
28 C.f. Procedural and substantive accounts of democracy.
29 For example, proceduralists could take the white flag analogy very seriously and look to establish
‘just war’ rules of discursive distinction, necessity, and proportionality to govern reciprocal misleading,
just as they govern reciprocal harm in conflict. Although in war we are permitted to harm unjust
attackers, this does not mean that there are no limits to the harm that we can impose. Proceduralists
could conceive of similar rules for lying. Such rules would ensure that white flags still hold weight on
the discursive battlefield.
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